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SIMPLICITY, ANALOGY AND PLAIN 
RELIGIOUS LIVES 
John King-Farlow 
Aquinas and Maimonides, as well as several Muslim thinkers of the thirteenth 
century, emphasized much older traditions in arguing that perfect simplicity must 
characterize their perfect God. Some modern believers continue to insist upon be-
lief in divine simplicity. Some even go on citing it as a primary reason for denying 
that plain religious believers in this life, unless made less plain by special light 
from heaven, can talk literally about their God. There are sceptics annoyed to find 
their long favoured target, "God's necessary existence", defended with such ad-
vanced analytical tools as forms of modal logic. It is tempting to take the often con-
nected doctrine of simplicity to be an easier mark. I 
In what follows I hope to show (1) that this idea of divine "simplicity" does make 
sense and is useful for talk about God; (2) that it does lend support to temperate, if 
not to overpowering claims about the need for analogical predication in matters of 
faith; (3) that, when distinguished from each other and from some Hellenistic 
metaphysical baggage, the notions of simplicity and analogy are both philosophi-
cally manageable and helpful within plain, if theologically inquisitive, religious 
lives. 
(I) Two Opposed Christian Views of Literal Claims About God 
In Chapter Two of his valuable and extremely readable book Religious Belief 
and Religious Skepticism2 , Gary Gutting sets in contrast two opposed views of in-
telligibility and religious language. These belong to his own colleagues Alvin 
Plantinga and David Burrell. Gutting begins with the following words from Plan-
tinga: 
It is a piece of sheer confusion to say that there is such a person as God, 
but none of our concepts apply to him .. .If our concepts do not apply to 
God, then our concepts of being loving, almighty, wise, creator and re-
deemer do not apply to him, in which case he is not loving, almighty, 
wise, a creator or a redeemer. He won't have any of the properties Chris-
tians ascribe to him. In fact he won't have any of the properties of which 
we have concepts ... The fact is this being won't have any properties at all, 
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since our concept of having at least one property does not apply to him. 
But how could there be any such thing? How could there be a being that 
didn't exist, wasn't self-identical, wasn't either a material or immaterial 
thing, didn't have any properties? Does any of this make even marginal 
sense? It is clearly quite impossible that there be anything to which none 
of our concepts apply. 3 
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Gutting at least partly endorses Plantinga by saying "Consider, for example, the 
suggestion, popular among contemporary theologians, that none of our concepts 
are applicable to God. In this boldform, the suggestion is certainly absurd."4 But in 
a less bold form, Gutting goes on to add, the suggestion is brilliantly developed in 
David Burrell's works Exercises in Religious UnderstandingS and Aquinas: God 
and Action. 6 He cites from Burrell's earlier work: 
Aquinas probes the possibilities of different ways of thinking and speak-
ing to test for intimations which the outright denial might have opened up. 
He makes an implicit appeal to a quality of experience, a form of life 
which could prepare someone to adopt a way of speaking quite different 
from that adapted to physical objects.? 
Thus Aquinas, as understood by Burrell, comes up with an analogue of the doc-
trine, rejected by Plantinga, that none of our human concepts can apply to God. 
Gutting clarifies this view: 
The true significance of the via remotionis is to deny the possibility of 
making well formed statements about God. Far from yielding literally 
true negative statements about God, the moment of denial shows that we 
cannot properly say anything about God. 8 
If I have understood Burrell's ways of talking, we must accordingly ascend to 
metalinguistic remarks of very tortured, grammatically ill-formed kinds about our 
ordinary uses of "God" and of co-referential terms in our present language. Intima-
tions of God, may then guide us as a faithful community towards a wiser way of 
talking.9 
(II) Possible Sources of Disagreement Over "Literal" and "Analogical" 
From their words and silences it looks reasonable to infer that Burrell and Plan-
tinga are close to agreement on the first of the following points- points which 
often crop up in disputes about the possibility of literal or just of distantly analog-
ical talk about God. Gutting mentions several of these, but tends to fuse some and 
overlook features of others. 
(i) An infinitely perfect God would be in many ways too different from finite hu-
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mans for us ever to understand him. As for some other ways, His gifts of grace, re-
velation, human reason and excellent, inspired teachers can enable us to make con-
siderable progress (by human standards) in coming to understand. As for some 
other ways, God may choose to favour a number of us with further insights into His 
nature through visions, special intimations, prophetic dreams, and the like. In 
heaven a human person is given a far deeper comprehension and appreciation of 
God through the beatific vision. 
(ii) What some philosophers will want to distinguish as quite different kinds of 
"is" in contexts of use may include cases of predication, identity, identification, at-
tributing parts to wholes-["That is this ship's. "]-assigning individuals to sets, 
etc. But these will all be cases of "is" being used for predication in the broadest 
sense for purposes of discussing revealed and natural theology. 
(iii) When we predicate literally, in this broad sense of "predicate", something 
"P" of a subject "S", we must allow that not just the sense or connotation, but also 
the reference of denotation of "S" and "P" will have to be distinct. (Predication of 
"S" of "S" can be an exception.) The act of placing "is" or "is P" after "s" makes 
this clear by virtue of the most essential features of human thought and language. 
(iv) There is an essential connection between "intellectually distinguishable 
things" and "separable elements" in contexts where (in the broad sense of "predi-
cate") we literally predicate "P" of "S". This again pertains to the ways in which 
humans must think and speak. 
(v) Therefore, anything properly fit for receiving literal predications, true or 
false, must be composite and not simple. 10 
(vi) Therefore, deliberately making any literal predications of "God", or in 
some contexts of "The First Cause of all things"'! , etc., constitutes a denial of His 
simplicity. One would thereby reject the unity of His existence and essence. 
(vii) Again, by so denying the divine simplicity we are bound to imply that His 
existence is caused (as are all composites' existence in general), and also that His 
existence is not atemporal and immutable. This is getting close to blasphemy un-
less there is excusable ignorance. So we must conclude that it is conceptually ab-
surd and religiously impious (without excusable ignorance) to aim at literally de-
scribing God or applying any human concepts directly to the divine being. 
Burrell and Plantinga will both support proposition (i) or something like it. But 
Plantinga, as his quoted passage indicates, would consider it misleading, if not fol-
lowed by a statement that many of our concepts do apply literally to God. Burrell 
would call proposition (i) misleading, if not followed by the statement that none of 
our concepts can literally apply, and onl y some can be used analogically. Gutting's 
exposition makes it fair to infer that Burrell would also consider (i) superficial 
without the addition of something like (ii), (iii), (v), (vi), (vii). Explicit or implicit 
versions of the highly fallacious (iv) appear, according to my medievalist col-
league R. N. Bosley, in various thinkers from Parmenides through the Middle 
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Ages to Hume. 12 
When the position that very few of our concepts apply literally to God is derived 
from (i) alone, then a simple doctrine of analogy is enough. It is one which religi-
ous children can find intelligible. Moreover, many religious sophisticates can ac-
cept it as something independent of questionable impositions of Hellenic 
metaphysics on the Bible. 
Also, the doctrines that God is simple and that His existence and essence are one 
can be extricated from such philosophically and scripturally dubious, Hellenistic 
doctrines about causation, atemporal changelessness and predication. When this 
happens, the results should prove again to be intelligible to clear-headed, religious 
children. Also many theologically reflective adults can dwell on them as religi-
ously exciting in themselves and as possible further justification of what could be-
come an agreeably supported doctrine of analogy. 
In what follows I shall offer (A) such a modest account of the divine simplicity; 
(B) such a moderate account talk about of analogy-with allied points about its 
natural role in promoting plain believers' religious humility and joyful hopes. 13 
Possibly these analyses can guide faith to a fusion of what is most realistic both in 
Plantinga and in Burrell; (C) an exchange between Aquinas and a cultured plain 
believer on analogy, predication and' surface grammar' . 
(III A) The Divine Simplicity 
Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations heartily reproves himself for 
his earlier teaching that the world is composed of absolute simples. "Simple" and 
"complex", like "exact" and "inexact", he now insists, are only intelligible when 
used in relation to one or another appropriate activity. Can we, then, make religi-
ous sense of calling God a simple being? Can we, that is, if we don't mean some-
thing like "easy to--" or "simple-minded-", when we say "simple"? 
A very smoothly Wittgensteinian way of meeting the question is to say one can-
not understand believers' use of "God is simple" unless one shares in their form of 
life. An excellent reply to such relativism comes at the end of Gutting's chapter. 
Some primitive people's religious beliefs may be inextricable from their form of 
life: "By contrast, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, etc., articulate systems of 
truths and values designed to challenge and trans from their societies. "13 
In this vein I would say that talk of the divine simplicity, wisely employed, chal-
lenges us to think how an ideal might be instantiated in a person of vastly greater 
perfections than ourselves. In such a being, among other perfections, one would 
find a complete absence of self-conflict and self-deception, of 'weak spots', of in-
consistencies, of favouritism, of one set of glorious aims being pursued arbitrarily 
at the expense of different, yet equally noble sets, of inability to be just and loving 
to all persons, and much else that we already know to be opposed to fullness of in-
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tegrity and integration. Such a God is simple, as opposed to being selfishly 'com-
plex' or 'complicated'. Such a God is simple, as opposed to those 'fragmented' 
people's selves whose various sub-selves \4 have to be flattered, or made jealous, or 
intimidated, in order to get them to be consistently fair, to keep their promises, to 
avoid cruelty. We can meditate daily (as plain believers) on God as ideally simple. 
We can thus think of Him as challenging us to 'integrate' ourselves and become 
more harmoniously moral and benevolent beings, more open to truly new ideas 
and not just to variations on our old favourites. This can make us consistently hum-
bler, yet increasingly hopeful as well. 
You may ask: "But what of the supposed connection between the divine simplic-
ity and God's other perfections? What of the purported unity in God of all the 
'things' we humans call virtues? What of the alleged identity between His exis-
tence and His essence'? Are we to be fobbed off with only some naturalist or an-
thropopsychic ideals of simplicity?" 
Not at all. But let us take one step at a time. 
Suppose that N, a woman from Nevada, lives in India for three years. She shares 
in the work of a living saint, a quite holy person such as Mother Teresa. Soon after 
N's return, someone who is curious, but knows little about Mother Teresa, or 
sainthood, or anything to do with religion, asks N "Would you call her a kind per-
son? Would you call her loving, sane, sincere, peacejul?" 
N: "Yes, if I were in a great hurry, I could conscientiously call her all those 
things without qualification. But really that would be a misleading sort of reply. If 
someone truly wanted to know the answer as a matter of life and death, I'd put it 
more like this. If you could live close to such a saintly and holy person, you might 
say: 'Well, she certainly throws light on how such human terms of praise are used 
and how they ought to be used more realistically by human beings. I'd have to say 
she illustrates a staggering amount of virtues that we would admire at once or come 
very soon to praise. But in this case her partly 'superhuman' nature makes the vir-
tues we distinguish (and seem at the level of 'surface grammar' to separate), in 
most cases when we talk, give the curious, but substantial impression of being 'all-
of-a-piece' with each other. And there's something that goes with this 'all-of-a-
piece' quality of hers: she's unchanging, 'immutable', rather as we think of God. 
I don't mean 'outside time' in either case. I mean naturally, fixedly unswerving in 
the way she illuminates all these virtues. For another thing, if you getto know such 
a person well, you'd find it hard to think of her as anything less than immortal. 
Such a holy woman might' shed' her body, but such a unity of excellence would 
have to go on existing in some new form as a person. You come to feel that there's 
something 'essentially connected' between her holy kind of fused qualities in a 
person and her indissoluble existence. Her nature-not entirely unlike God's na-
ture-is not outside time, but not threatened by time." 
C. B. Martin, whose scepticism is also discussed by Gutting, has written: "The 
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trouble, however, with the idea that the basic item's properties are one with 
another and one with its very existence .. .is just that it is hogwash." ("God, the 
Null Set, and Divine Simplicity", 140). The trouble I have with Martin's remark is 
that if I heard someone speak in N's way from close knowledge of Mother Teresa, 
or Gandhi, or a Buddhist Abbott, I wouldn't find it hogwash at all. Why should any 
open-minded person find it hogwash if a Biblical believer not very mysteriously 
extends such a form of description to 'God-talk' in seeking to convey what is was 
like when she or he had an encounter or a vision of God? Suppose the believer ex-
tends it with expressed belief that what he experienced had to be the only creator, 
had to be the one entirely non dependent being. 
Now let us suppose the believer is a theologian and adds: 
There are things one experiences of God that one could not experience of 
a Saint. As Pseudo-Dionysius put it 'The one Cause of everything is not 
one of the many, but prior to all unity [outside Himself] and all plurality 
and determines all unity and plurality.' (Divine Names 13.2). But this 
person N who so richly experienced the holiness and presence of God in 
Mother Teresa is well on her way to a superhuman grasp of what Aquinas 
meant when he wrote: 'although predicates of this kind which the intellect 
on the basis of such conceptions attributes to God signify what the sub-
stance of God is, they do not signify it completely as it is, but as it is un-
derstood by us. (On the Power of God, 7.5)' .15 
Those like C. B. Martin would protest that "perfectly wise person" cannot mean 
"perfectly merciful person"; that "the concept of someone perfectly wise, perfectly 
merciful, perfectly loving, perfectly nondependent, ... " cannot mean "the concept 
of one who must exist". Presumably such assertions of what means what are for 
sceptics of Martin's line more of the same old hogwash: anyone who speaks En-
glish can see that they are necessarily false. But, of course, "means" is highly am-
biguous. Among other possibilities "means" naturally covers (1) sense and (2) re-
ference, (3) how we do use or understand a word or phrase, and (4) how we ought 
to use or understand a word or phrase if we were more enlightened. Ordinary use 
need not always show how we ought to use or understand a term in a relevant con-
text of religion-let alone of a special and repeated experience of the divine. 
Talk of the divine simplicity is not quite so obscure as some would like to think. 
(III B) Analogy and Plain Belief 
If God is simple in the ways considered, then some of the terms and sentences 
which we use to talk about Him can in some contexts, but need not always be mis-
leading. On the other hand, we have seen thatthe chance of believers' being misled 
sometimes by what they say about God already follows quite obviously enough 
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from the less controversial point that God, unlike us, is supremely perfect. There-
fore, we do not have to be so sanguine as Plantinga about the literal applicability of 
great droves of our concepts to the divine nature. But neither need we be as radi-
cally anti-literal and tortuous as Burrell. 
Christian philosophers seeking light on uses of language for plain religious liv-
ing should not be afraid to gamble a little on Jesus's own uses in the Gospels. At 
Matthew 19.16.17 one reads: '''Teacher, what good must I do, to have eternal 
life?" Jesus replied: "Why do you ask me about what is good? There is only One 
who is good.'" Jesus appears to use his reply to make two literal points about God 
and man. The first is that a term of such veneration (or a term used here with such 
veneration) should be directed only to God-not to 'good works', teachers, mas-
ters, high priests and other imperfect acts or people. The second is that careless be-
lievers should reflect much more carefully on how "good" is used and on how it 
should be used realistically in plain religious life. He thus seems to show limited 
approval both to literalists and to analogists. The same appears to be true of the 
Parable of the Prodigal Son. It is used in part to make very clearly the literal point 
that God will accept our sincere repentance, even after much wrongdoing. It also 
challenges us to reflect further on what a perfectly wise father would be like, and 
how unlike some of the fathers we know: what does "wise father" really mean in 
the four mentioned senses of "mean"? (Analogical advocates of the via negativa 
and remotion get an invitation to begin their subtractings. Theologically minded 
semanticists get an invitation to look back at earlier, more relaxed, once revolutio-
nary notions like logical constructions and surface grammar). 
What are plain believers to say if they consider the struggle between ' hyper-
literalists' like Plantinga and hyper-analogists like Burrell? Let us think now of 
some otherwise plain believersl6who took several good courses of philosophy and 
theology in college. Starting with the most obvious point, I suggest, they could 
well speak rather like this: 
'Analogy' sounds imposing when we want to say that one thing is similar 
to or resembles another; that the two share at least one common property. 
But there is no universally accepted way of deciding in all cases how great 
or how significant a spread of likeness must be, or how many and how 
significant the common properties must be, for a genuine analogy to 
exist. In most cases it would be a poor joke to say, for example, 'Walt 
Disney was an American analogue of Praxiteles, since both were well 
known and both copied human figures'. 
Of course, we often have to use similes, metaphors, models, analogies, parables, 
etc., to talk about a perfect God in as illuminating a way as we can. But 
philosophers and linguists have shown how much we use similes, metaphors and 
the rest in very ordinary language to talk about very familiar things. 17 Jesus Him-
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self in attacking the Pharisees could shift gears easily from 'literally' calling them 
hypocrites to ' analogically' calling them whited sepulchres. The way that some-
one like Burrell will argue suggests that there is an unfailing decision procedure for 
picking out and setting apart all literal remarks or literal uses of remarks. 
"The best defense among plain believers for having a greatly reduced form of 
Burrell's or Aquinas' teachings on analogy is this: it should make increased humil-
ity tie up closely with increased joy in our religious expectations. Humility, if I 
may draw on the late Ronald Knox's words in a sermon, is largely a matter of 
realism about ourselves, other people and God-and about what is more and what 
is less valuable and praiseworthy in certan crucial dimensions. For this purpose we 
need to set aside for reflection a good number of possible, but properly provoking 
descriptions of God and men. We ought to meditate on some of the different impli-
cations or 'contextual implicatures' which radiate from, for example, describing, 
or praising, or thanking a deity and a human being with the same words or phrases. 
We can usefully, in a Christian community, try to agree on a particular set of terms 
with strong tendencies to mislead us. We can call them' specially analogical'. We 
can let discussion or meditation on them produce greater humility and happier ex-
pectations: the more different God is from us in certain ways, and so the better He 
is, then the better we are loved and the better eternal life will be for us in His pre-
sence. Of course, there will be other words we agree to call literal in describing 
God: they strike us as being (relatively) so much less controversial. Take, for 
example, Plantinga's examples: loving and immaterial. But even what we will 
style "literal items" are worth raking over the coals occasionally for our purpose of 
reflecting on God's superiority and love. The grammatical forms of literal predica-
tion, which may encourage those without faith to say we do not treat God as sim-
ple, need never mislead us after childhood. Rather similarly, we can say literally 
(after childhood) that numbers exist far greater than one billion, without mislead-
ing each other in any Platonist directions. 
"The most useful aspect of Plantinga' s literalism is that it seems to fit the follow-
ing point. In a religious family we learn the word 'God' partly as a proper name and 
partly as a definite description. There must be some core of largely clear and un-
problematic statements about God for the learner, (not always exactly the same for 
all Christian learners), or the phenomenon of children's becoming believers or in-
formed sceptics in religious families would not be part of our history. In that case 
sophisticated theism could hardly begin without an amazing series of ad hoc inter-
ventions by God in the human brain." 
(IV) The Plain Believer, Analogy and Saint Thomas 
Aquinas and Burrell might well object. St. Thomas, for example, would person-
ally say: 
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"This plain religious believer has 'castrated the stallions of analogy'. 
Even in theological commerce one must not settle for too little. This plain 
religious believer, in dealing with analogy, has settled for the right to ex-
plain in human language a number of important ways in which humans or 
other created beings stand in the relation of resemblance to their Creator. 
(The perfect and thus utterly non-dependent creator cannot, I must re-
mind this believer, stand in any real relation to created and ever depen-
dent creatures). But where this plain believer stops is only where I begin. 
As I and some of my later Thomist or Neo-Thomist followers have 
shown, talk of analogy and resemblance must be related to a pair of cru-
cial terms: proportion and proportionality." 
The plain believer replies: 
"I think you miss two points of great importance. First, if a doctrine of 
analogy did not primarily serve the purposes I laid down, it would be 
largely irrelevant to the religious lives and needs of almost all believers in 
the secular world. Greater 'sophistication' may help to make a wise ap-
proach wiser, but it is likely to be this wise approach to God and analogy 
which is really essential for ordinary people. Second, it is conventionally 
"wrong" or infelicitous to say 'Queen Sirikit resembles King-Farlow's 
Thai wife', 'Queen Elizabeth shares Mrs. Allstone's views on scholarly 
conventions', 'God resembles man in certain ways.' The term for the less 
lofty referent of the two, thanks to polite convention or reverent taste, is 
felt to have the proper place in the subject position before such verbs. But 
this does not show that, from a logical point of view, X's resembling Y 
does not entail Y's "really" resembling X. You may objectthat because Y 
is simple and devoid of distinct properties, while X is complex with many 
distinct properties, X cannot be said to resemble Y -for that would be to 
suggest that X has a distinct property among others which Y also has 
among others. But, I should point out, the divine simplicity seems to be 
such that forming "logical constructions" by abstraction (or extraction) 
from one's understanding of God's nature, as Jesus does in parables and 
in direct speech about divine requirements of men, legitimates one's 
speaking of creatures as having certain properties which resemble some 
of God's "logically constructed" (LC) properties and vice versa. Just so, 
if Jones somewhat resembles the average plumber, then the average 
plumber somewhat resembles Jones. (After childhood we know enough 
about surface grammar18 not to reify the average plumber or send him a 
letter). Hence we can, with felicitous mental reservations, say that in 
some ways creatures resemble the Creator and the Creator, therefore, re-
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sembles creatures in some ways. And, thanks to revelation and grace, a 
Christian knows a few descriptions to be literally true." 
Aquinas responds: 
"Very well. Your point may bring us somewhat closer together. 'The av-
erage plumber' does not stand for any distinct person, but is a term, 
(based on abstraction from truths about many plumbers), which can be 
the subject of literally true propositions. An obvious example would be: 
'The average plumber charges fifty dollars an hour.' In a converse way 
we can helpfully abstract from our limited understanding of the simple 
and singular divine nature, then come up with a plurality of descriptive 
terms. They are ' logically constructed' (LC) predicates, standing in im-
portant kinds of relations to many predicates which we can literally apply 
to finite beings. We can use LC-predicates with prudence and come up 
with literally true sentences if we know how not to be misled, as you say, 
by surface grammar. For example, God is LC-Ioving in ways partly com-
parable with those of the loving father in certain of Christ's parables or 
those of a (historical) loving father like Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Given 
your point about explicitly admitted LC-properties, this statement can 
(perhaps) be literally true, whereas 'God is my loving father' can only be 
analogically true in any human use. (I don't agree with you that grace and 
revelation give us a literal understanding of even a very few truths that are 
not LC-truths about God. And I only allow that the felicity conditions are 
perfectly satisfied for literal ascriptions of logically constructed proper-
ties to God where both speaker and hearer have enough linguistic and 
theological education, as well as grace with revealed truths, so as not to 
be misled by the forms of 'surface grammar' into denying the divine 
simplicity. Christians must wait, like all others who are saved, for the 
beatific vision before they can literally understand the truth conditions of 
our sentence 'God is loving! ')". 
The plain believer asks: 
"Very well, then, what about the value of talk about proportion and prop-
ortionality in connection with analogical language or uses of language?" 
St. Thomas leaps in: 
"Analogy of proportion (analogia secundum convenientiam propor-
tionis) must be distinguished from analogy of proportionality (analogia 
secundum convenientiam proportionatis). I believe that some of the later 
Scholastics' involvement with what is now called analogy of attribution 
is what I call analogy of proportion. Some seem to have later rebaptized 
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my analogy of proportionality as analogy of proportion. I use 'analogy of 
proportion' to cover cases of this sort: a predicate like 'holy' is properly 
used as a teml applying primarily and perfectly to the infinitely holy 
Godhead, but secondarily and imperfectly to a finite, but holy man like 
John the Baptist. On the other hand, although between 8 and 4 there is a 
resemblance of proportion, the relation holding between 6 to 3 and 4 to 2 
is one of resemblance of proportionality. 'What ocular vision is to the 
eye, intellectual vision is to the mind.' 'Rather as Joseph was deeply but 
finitely loved by his earthly father, Jacob, so Jesus was deeply and infi-
nitely loved by his Heavenly Father.' See my De Veritate (passim) or 
Father Frederick Copleston's admirable History of Philosophy for all this 
and more on my philosophy of religious language." 
Our plain believer might reply: 
"Very well then, suppose I say with due reflection: 'God's LC-knowl-
edge is to my knowledge as an infinite time is to a second. ' In this case of 
mentioning what you call a resemblance or analogy of proportionality, 
there are interesting reasons for calling the sentence literally true when 
used among Christians. For talk of 'God's LC-knowledge' conveys a li-
mited, but serious amount of intelligible truths to a well-instructed, but 
plain believer, who is too blessed to be misled by surface grammar. For 
God's knowledge has no limits and my knowledge is extremely re-
stricted. If something is said in a colorful, comparative way, this does not 
force us to call the saying "analogical". And once the plain believer satis-
fies something like your 'felicity conditions' he understands the basic 
ideas of limited and unlimited, of divine simplicity, abstracting and logi-
cal constructions (like the average plumber). Compare my numerical sets 
of examples again: "There really do exist numbers that are far greater than 
n" may be used literally, yet need not be used to ontologize a separate 
realm of numbers. Hence talk of God's LC-know ledge is often unlikely to 
be misleading or too mysterious. Then there are factors which may well 
make us want to drop the "LC" and say that some such talk of infinite and 
finite time and of God's and my knowledge must be treated as analogical 
and a case of analogy of proportionality. (You and I have given enough 
examples of proportion already.) The importance of humility, along with 
a preference for speaking simply about shared beliefs with other Christ-
ians, may usually justify offering and viewing our sentences as analogical 
speech. But I suspect that when the plain believer wants to use his former 
theological and philosophical education for talk with professional theolo-
gians or with similarly learned laymen, he has the right to invoke logical 
constructions of divine properties, as Jesus often did. Then he may treat 
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not all, but much more of his claims as literal claims, though as literal 
claims whose 'surface grammar' is not allowed to count against belief in 
God's simplicity." 
Aquinas: 
"I can feel some such dialectical tension between viewing some uses of 
metalinguistically refined statements about God's LC-properties first as 
literally true, if sometimes grammatically misleading, and then as true, 
but analogical predications. For if the LC-approach is taken with explicit 
acknow ledgement of limitations posed both by our surface grammar and, 
more importantly by God's infinity, non-dependence and simplicity, then 
we can hope to follow Jesus's example prudently in alternating between 
parables and literal claims about what God wants of us mortals." 
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Gary Gutting, as I mentioned before, closes his chapter on analogy and religious 
language with a splendid point against Wittgenstein: outside primitive societies 
like the Zande's, a religion is not a form of life. "By contrast, Christianity, Buddh-
ism, Hinduism, etc., articulate sytems of truths and values designed to challenge 
and transform their societies." (77, my italics.) My plain believer's account of 
what a reformed, pragmatic approach to talk of analogy would entail is very much 
in keeping with the thrust of Gutting's conclusion. If truly open and inspired, the 
required discussions and meditations on God's qualities and purposes for man 
would challenge us first to transform ourselves so as to become wiser and more 
realistic. Then believers would be far better equipped to transform the society 
around them. The continuing Pharisaical equation of admirability with wealth 
piled up at other citizens' and other nations' expense could finally be dissolved. 
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